When founders buy back their companies: the price, control and the right to the future

You can sell shares at an excellent price and make a bad deal. Years later, you can buy them back at a higher price and make a good one.

The contradiction disappears once you understand that the two transactions involve more than just buying and selling the same asset.

Circumstances change. The company’s capabilities. Shareholders’ needs. The value of alternative options. And, above all, the importance of the right to decide what happens next.

This reflection was prompted by the highly interesting report by Kostis Christodoulou in CNN Greece, “Giorgos Korres joins the ‘exclusive’ club of Greek entrepreneurs who took back their companies,” published on 28 September 2026. It brings together different stories of entrepreneurs and families who sold stakes, lost managerial influence or became part of larger corporate structures and later returned in a stronger position.

The easy reading is almost cinematic: the creator parts with his creation, discovers that nobody can understand it as he does and returns to save it.

But this narrative, however appealing, is not enough for an entrepreneur to make a serious decision.

A buyback does not in itself prove that the original sale was a mistake. Nor does the founder’s return prove that the company will operate better. To judge that, we need evidence that rarely fits into a headline: investments, cash flows, borrowing, returns, contractual rights and the actual alternatives available at each stage.

The big question is not just “how much is my company worth?” It is “who will decide what is worth doing with my company after I sign?”

The stories behind the “comebacks”

The cases collected by CNN share a common thread: renegotiating the relationship between ownership, management and business direction. They are not, however, the same type of transaction.

Korres: a return to control, but with a new investment partner

The report begins with Giorgos Korres, the pharmacist who founded the company bearing his name approximately thirty years ago and is now participating in a new deal with Halcyon Equity Partners. The Hellenic Competition Commission’s official announcement states that notification was submitted on 15 September 2026 of the acquisition of joint control of KORRES S.A. by Halcyon and Herbarium Holding Limited, through which the Korres side participates. This is a transaction notification; it should not be confused with confirmation of its completion.

The distinction is substantive. This does not describe a return to a company without external capital, or sole control by the founder. It describes a new partnership structure.

The previous structure, established through the 2017 agreement and the subsequent transaction, included an investment vehicle managed by Morgan Stanley, Profex and the Korres side. Giorgos Korres had remained in management. The “return” therefore primarily concerns the shareholder balance and control, not the reappearance of someone who had disappeared from the business.

This is precisely where the strategic interest lies: the founder is not necessarily rejecting investment capital. He may be choosing a different partner for a different phase.

MINION: the return of ownership does not guarantee the return of viability

Giannis Georgakas’s story has a different background. After the devastating fire of 19 December 1980, MINION failed to recover and in 1983, under Andreas Papandreou’s government, was nationalized as a distressed business.

In 1991, Georgakas and a group of investors bought it back from the State, submitting the highest bid in the relevant tender. One year later, at the age of 79, he stepped down, selling his stake. The department store closed permanently in 1998. CNN highlights him as an emblematic case of an entrepreneur who regained his company from the Greek State, while the name of his creation endured in business memory.

This story also serves as a counterweight to the romance of the comeback.

Taking back a business does not mean that its competitiveness, financing or market position are automatically restored. The ownership problem and the business problem may be different.

Papadopoulou: the value of the right to have options later

According to CNN, Danone gradually acquired 60% of biscuit manufacturer Papadopoulou between 1991 and 1995. 1995 was also the year when Ioanna Papadopoulou, daughter of Evangelos Papadopoulos, took the helm.

In 2007, following negotiations, she bought back the stake, restoring 100% ownership to the family. The price reported at the time was €105 million, financed through bank borrowing.

There is a detail here of major strategic significance. Euro2day’s reporting at the time states that Ioanna Papadopoulou held a right of first refusal under the previous agreement. This development coincided with the sale of Danone’s biscuit business, which included LU, to Kraft Foods in 2007 — the historically accurate corporate name of the buyer that year, rather than the later reference to Mondelez.

This does not mean that a contractual provision alone is enough to secure a buyback. Money, negotiation and the right circumstances are also needed.

It does, however, offer a practical insight: an option you secure when signing can acquire enormous value many years later.

ION: even a minority stake can create strategic conflict

CNN describes the sale of 24.5% of ION in 1988 by a shareholder outside the inner circle of the Kotsiopoulos and Karkazis families. The story develops into a prolonged conflict with a foreign shareholder, linked to its presence in competitor Pavlidis and, consequently, the sensitivity of access to strategic plans and new products. The report mentions the exclusion of the foreign party from corporate bodies and the eventual repurchase of the stake, after approximately a decade, for a substantial price.

Care is needed regarding the investor’s identity: the original article refers to Nabisco and subsequently Kraft, also including the historical reference to cooperation with Karelias on Camel. However, older archival reporting by To Vima attributes the 24.5% stake to Kraft Jacobs Suchard and describes Nabisco as an interested buyer. Therefore, the specific Nabisco–Kraft sequence in the original article cannot be adopted here as verified.

The strategic issue, however, is clear: having a financial shareholder is one thing; having a shareholder whose interests are linked to a competing business is another.

And one more point: selling a minority stake does not automatically amount to losing control. It can, however, create problems of information, trust and coexistence disproportionate to the percentage.

Chipita: a buyback can be an intermediate step toward a subsequent sale

Spyros Theodoropoulos’s case does not fit easily into the narrative of “I sold, regretted it and returned.”

In 2006, Chipita became part of Vivartia, alongside businesses such as Delta, Barba Stathis and the Goody’s group. Theodoropoulos led the broader structure for a period. In 2010, when it had come under Andreas Vgenopoulos’s MIG, he bought back the Chipita business together with the Saudi Olayan group, in a transaction CNN puts at €400 million.

This was followed by the sale agreement with Mondelez, announced in May 2021 at a price of approximately $2 billion and completed on 3 January 2022. The distinction between agreement and completion matters here too.

The buyback, then, was not necessarily the end of the relationship with larger investors. It could be the beginning of a new growth cycle that culminated in another sale.

There is no need to turn the two prices into a rough return multiple. The currency and timing differ, as potentially do the scope, financing and intervening investments. The useful lesson is the succession of different ownership structures for different business phases.

MEVGAL: control can be lost within the shareholder family itself

At MEVGAL, CNN describes the coexistence of three families and DELTA with a minority stake. For approximately a decade, from 2006 to 2016, the Papadakis and Chatzitheodorou families had formed an alliance, removing Mary Chatzakou from management.

Her return involved changes in alliances and shareholder balances. Subsequently, support from Spyros Theodoropoulos, with whom she had maintained a business friendship for decades, helped strengthen the family’s control. CNN links this ability to the liquidity he obtained from the sale of Chipita.

Chronologically, it is useful to distinguish the family’s return to management in 2016 from the later shareholder development in 2021, when Vivartia’s stake passed to the Chatzakou family and Theodoropoulos.

Neither Mary Chatzakou nor Theodoropoulos needed to hold 100% at all times to lead their businesses. This case is a reminder that real power is also shaped by alliances.

Governance problems do not arise only when an outside investor comes in. They may already exist among people who share a common history.

Skroutz: later value is not a fair measure of an early decision

In 2006, one year after Skroutz was founded, its founders sold 50% to Dionic for €300,000, according to CNN. Expectations for the partnership did not materialize as originally planned: Skroutz was growing, while Dionic was facing financial problems.

In February 2018, following pressure from the banks, the stake returned to Avgoustidis, Dimou and Chatzigeorgiou for €10,001,000.

In May 2026, Blackstone announced an agreement to acquire a majority stake from CVC. The official announcement provides for the founders to sell part of their holding, retain a stake and continue leading the company. The €635 million reported by CNN requires an important clarification: the relevant Reuters dispatch describes it as a valuation of the company including debt, not a confirmed price for the majority stake alone.

It is tempting to compare the €300,000 with the later valuation and conclude that the original deal was obviously bad.

But that is judgment with the benefit of hindsight. Those amounts alone do not tell us the probability of success in 2006, what options the founders had or precisely what the partnership offered or constrained.

The right question is not “why did they not know how much it would be worth twenty years later?” It is “had they designed the relationship adequately so they could act when the two sides’ needs diverged?”

Palirroia: a buyback can bring a good partnership to a close

In 2019, Vasilis Katsos’s VNK Capital acquired 36% of Palirroia Souliotis, aiming to strengthen its international reach.

According to CNN, after approximately seven years, a sale of the company to a foreign fund was considered, at a valuation close to €250 million. Relations between the two sides are described as excellent. Kostas Souliotis proposed buying back the 36% so that the company would become fully family-owned again. The report of 28 September mentions expected completion by the end of 2026; we therefore do not treat it as an already completed transaction.

This is perhaps the clearest reminder that an investor’s departure does not have to mean conflict.

The partnership may simply have completed the cycle for which it was created.

Stock exchange delistings: a different mechanism, a related question

CNN adds the cases of companies that chose to buy back shares and delist from the stock exchange: the Georgatos family with Grigoris Mikrogevmata, the Gerardos family with Plaisio, the Sarantis family with Akritas, as well as Kepenos Mills, Korres, Kyriakoulis and Karatzis.

These moves are not the same as buying back a stake from a strategic partner. They do, however, raise a related question: which ownership and financing environment best serves the next phase of a particular business?

The big lesson: every investor also brings a definition of success

The stories above are not sufficient to assign blame to specific individuals. We do not have the shareholders’ agreements, business plans, each side’s returns or what would have happened without the transaction before us.

They do, however, allow us to see a mechanism that every entrepreneur should examine:

When shareholders change, the way the company decides what success means may also change.

For a founder, success may mean a resilient company that will still exist in twenty years, maintain a particular standard of quality and grow at a pace it can sustain.

For a strategic buyer, it may mean that the company strengthens the overall portfolio: providing technology, distribution, production capacity or access to a market.

For a private equity investor, value creation is also linked to the ability to realize their investment. The exit discussion is therefore part of the partnership from the outset, not an unpleasant surprise that emerges later.

None of these approaches is inherently wrong. Conflict arises when the two sides agree on a broad word — “growth” — without agreeing on the decisions it entails.

Will we invest more, even if profitability temporarily falls? Will we keep a brand independent or integrate it? Will we reject a profitable partnership because it creates strategic dependence? Will we wait for an investment to mature or pursue an exit at the first attractive offer?

The agreement is tested in these choices. Not in the joint announcement photograph.

The hidden variable is the right to wait

One particularly critical aspect of control is the ability to say:

“We will not maximize this year’s results because we want to create something more significant.”

This is not an excuse for inefficiency. The founder must substantiate their choices. But an investment in a brand, people, a product or a new market requires an agreed time horizon and evaluation criteria.

If one shareholder considers waiting reasonable and the other sees the same wait as failure, more money will not solve the problem. A shared understanding is needed of what is being financed and when it should deliver returns.

Autonomy is not just about 51%

Percentages do not tell the whole story. Veto rights over the budget, business plan, major investments or the appointment of senior management can, depending on their structure, give even a minority shareholder effective joint control. The European approach to merger control recognizes this distinction. Not every minority protection right, however, amounts to control.

So “I kept the majority” is not a complete answer.

You need to be able to explain who decides, on which issues, with what majority and what happens when there is no agreement.

Is selling to a larger company or a fund ultimately a good thing?

Yes, it can be an excellent decision. Provided that the transaction solves the right problem and that the price does not prevent you from seeing the other terms.

A sale can allow an entrepreneur to reduce the concentration of their personal wealth in the company, organize succession or gain a partner with resources and capabilities they lack. Not every solution requires a full exit: minority investments can also combine personal liquidity with continued business involvement.

But the entrepreneur needs to distinguish three outcomes: their personal financial position, the health of the business and their influence over decisions.

A transaction may improve the first and limit the third. That is not necessarily bad, provided it is a conscious choice. Conversely, it may leave the founder in a strong formal position while burdening the business with commitments that undermine the second.

The problem begins when everything is labeled a “successful deal” because the price is impressive.

A brief strategic guide before selling or bringing in an investor

The following is a framework for strategic evaluation, not personalized legal, tax or investment advice. Implementation requires specialist advisers and adaptation to the specific company, transaction and jurisdiction.

1. Separate your own needs from the company’s needs

Before discussing valuation, write down why you are considering the transaction.

Does the company need capital to grow? Do you need personal liquidity? Is there a succession issue? Do you want to step down from management or simply share the risk? Preparing for an exit begins with clarifying these different objectives.

A basic financial distinction: buying existing shares from the founder is different from injecting new capital into the company. In the first case, the consideration goes to the seller. In the second, the business receives funding. A deal can combine both, but that combination must be clear.

Do not present a transaction as growth financing if it does not provide the resources for growth.

And do not automatically sell shares to address a problem that might be solved through better management, a commercial partnership, refinancing or a different organizational structure. Those alternatives also have costs and risks; nevertheless, they are worth comparing before choosing to permanently relinquish a stake.

2. Choose an investor based on the constraint you need to remove

“They bring money” is an inadequate criterion. Available routes include a strategic sale, a full or partial sale to private equity, family investment structures and other forms of transfer or partnership.

The following distinction is useful as a starting point for evaluation, not as a stereotype:

Do not accept the phrase “we will open up markets for you” without asking which markets, through which people, with what resource commitments and with which progress indicators.

The investor’s reputation may give you confidence. It does not replace a partnership plan.

3. Prepare a company that can operate without depending on you for everything

A business becomes more transaction-ready when it has reliable financial reporting, clear roles, documented processes and less day-to-day dependence on the founder. This preparation takes time and also protects the company’s operations while the owner is absorbed in the sale process.

In financial and commercial due diligence, do not settle for an EBITDA figure. Examine the repeatability of results, collection of receivables, investment needs, liabilities and customer concentration. The buyer needs to understand exactly what they are buying and which risks are not reflected in a summary presentation.

From a strategic perspective, I would add one more question:

What part of the value genuinely resides in the company, and what part still resides only in the founder’s phone, memory and personal relationships?

The answer is not to make the founder disappear. It is to turn their knowledge into organizational capability.

That is useful even if you ultimately do not sell.

4. Compare the actual financial outcome, not just the valuation

The value of the business operations — enterprise value — is not the same as the value attributable to the shares — equity value. Borrowing, cash balances and agreed adjustments affect the transition from one measure to the other.

A simplified hypothetical example:

If a business is valued at €10 million, has €3 million in debt and €1 million in cash that is agreed to be added to the value, the equity value comes to €8 million, before other adjustments. Selling 60% then corresponds to €4.8 million, not €6 million, assuming proportional consideration and identical economic rights.

You then need to clarify how much is paid at completion, how much is withheld, which amounts depend on future performance and which liabilities remain with the seller.

Particular attention is required for the earn-out: additional consideration linked to future results. Clear definitions of targets, accounting principles, information and protections against decisions that can affect its calculation are needed.

My practical principle would be this: do not value an amount that depends on decisions you will not control after the transaction as guaranteed income.

5. Agree on how decisions will be made before disagreement arises

The shareholders’ agreement can regulate board composition, required approval thresholds, information, share transfers and dispute-resolution mechanisms. These are core tools of the relationship, not decorative appendices.

Ask for their practical operation to be illustrated through real decisions: a major investment, replacing the chief executive, taking on additional borrowing, entering a new market.

As for your own role, distinguish the shareholder’s rights from the executive’s authority. Retaining a title does not in itself answer what you will be able to decide.

There is also the human side: you may want the liquidity of a sale but not be ready to stop having the final say. Emotional and managerial preparation for the change is an essential part of the process.

It is not reasonable to sell control and regard every future disagreement as a breach of an unwritten promise that nothing will change.

6. Protect the economic substance of your stake

For a shareholder who remains, what matters is not just the percentage but also how the company transacts, distributes value and makes decisions.

The OECD highlights the risks that can arise from related-party transactions and the importance of appropriate approval procedures, transparency and minority shareholder protection.

Consider, for example, a company that, after acquisition, buys services from the new shareholder’s group or channels sales through another of its companies. This does not presuppose malpractice. But there must be a clear way to assess the terms, particularly when the value of your own stake or an earn-out depends on local results.

The strategic question is specific:

How will it be ensured that value creation for the broader group does not take place opaquely at the expense of the company in which you remain a shareholder?

7. Plan the exit while there is still a willingness to cooperate

Transfer rights require careful negotiation. Tag-along rights concern a minority shareholder’s ability to participate in a sale under agreed terms. Drag-along rights may allow other shareholders to be required to participate in a sale when the relevant conditions are met. A right of first refusal governs the opportunity to purchase before a transfer to a third party.

The names are not enough. Their conditions, price, exceptions, deadlines and implementation must be examined.

For anyone considering a future buyback, there is a second, independent test: even if a purchase option is secured, will financing be available to exercise it?

The Papadopoulou case shows why such provisions are worth examining. It does not mean they constitute free insurance. Every right carries a negotiating cost, while an agreement that fully protects one side may be unacceptable to the other.

The aim is not to eliminate every risk. It is to know which risks you are taking and how they can be addressed.

8. Test the agreement against a difficult year

Before signing, I would suggest a joint discussion of four hypothetical scenarios:

This is a proposed stress test, not a prediction that things will go badly.

Its benefit is that it turns vague “alignment” into observable answers. If you cannot calmly discuss these possibilities before the transaction, there is reason to examine the partnership more carefully.

9. Conduct due diligence on the investor too — and protect the process

The investor will scrutinize the business. The entrepreneur likewise needs to understand the investor.

I would request conversations with people from their previous partnerships, especially those that did not unfold according to the original plan. Who makes the final decision? How do they respond when additional funding is needed? How stable is the team that will work with you?

The standard process includes confidentiality, initial terms, detailed due diligence and negotiation of the final agreement. Due diligence can confirm the rationale for the transaction, lead to changes or justify walking away.

When the prospective buyer is a competitor, information sharing requires particular care. Restricted access, independent advisers and appropriate review teams can help protect sensitive data. The existence of negotiations does not make every exchange of commercial information harmless.

It is equally important to have independent advice on the legal structure, tax consequences, liabilities and required approvals. A share purchase and a purchase of individual businesses or assets do not have identical consequences.

10. Plan what comes next before the transaction closes

The transition requires agreement on roles, communication, financial headroom and the approach to integration. Expected synergies do not materialize automatically and may require more time or cost than initially estimated.

Before signing, I would want a specific plan for the first hundred days: which people must stay, which customer relationships need protection, which decisions must not be delayed and which changes must not be rushed.

This is also where a critical dimension for the brand lies.

If you are buying a company because customers trust its quality, you need to understand which practices create that trust before simply labeling them “cost.”

You can improve a metric in the short term by cutting something that produces long-term value. The aim is to distinguish genuine inefficiency from investment that has not yet been fully reflected in results.

What all this means for the buyer

The same guide can also be read from the other side of the table.

The buyer first needs a clear investment rationale: why this company, what it adds and how value will be created after the acquisition. Detailed due diligence must test that rationale, not merely seek evidence that justifies a decision already made.

Three pitfalls deserve particular attention.

The first is paying upfront for all the value you hope to create yourself later. If the price leaves room only for the ideal scenario, the transaction starts without sufficient resilience.

The second is treating the founder as essential to the valuation yet unnecessary for the transition. If the business relies on their knowledge and relationships, transferring that capability must be a genuine project, with assigned responsibilities and time.

The third is confusing control with understanding. Acquiring the right to change something does not prove that you have yet understood why it existed.

The discipline of acquisition is not complete when you secure financing. It is complete when you can explain how the business will operate better under new ownership.

The most important thing to protect

The stories of Korres, Papadopoulou, ION, Chipita, MEVGAL, Skroutz, Palirroia and MINION do not add up to an argument against investors.

They add up to an argument for serious preparation.

Full ownership is not self-evidently superior. A founder can keep all the shares and personally constrain their company’s development. They can also sell a substantial stake and create something with the new partner that they could not have created alone.

Likewise, a return is not always vindication. It must be assessed on the same terms as an initial purchase: capabilities, price, financing, risks and plan.

The entrepreneur needs to be honest about a deeper question:

Do they want to protect the conditions under which the company creates value, or do they want to protect their own need to remain irreplaceable?

These are not always the same thing.

A good agreement does not promise that nothing will change. It clarifies which changes are sought, which resources will support them, how they will be evaluated and what will happen when shareholders disagree.

That is why, before asking how much someone is willing to pay, you need to know exactly what you are willing to let them decide.

Do not sell rights to your company’s future having negotiated only today’s price.

FAQ